Using the global tobacco advocacy networks as a case study, this article argues that the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999), which theorises how advocacy coalitions affect policymaking domestically, and Keck and Sikkink's research into transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998) can provide insights into the mechanisms of how transnational advocacy networks impact both local and intergovernmental policymaking. I argue that by combining aspects of each of these approaches, all sides of a policy situation can be analysed. I contrast these approaches with the epistemic communities approach (Haas 1992), suggesting that, for the tobacco policy system, the epistemic communities approach provides less insight than the other two.
Many policy researchers have investigated the roles played by policy networks in the policy process (recent examples include Keck and Sikkink 1998; Laumann and Knoke 1987; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Marsh and Smith 2000; Sperling, Ferree, et al. 2001) , and the vast majority of this research has focused on domestic policy networks (see Marsh 1998 for an overview of the policy networks literature). However, over the past fifty years there has been an enormous increase in the numbers of transnational nongovernmental social change organisations (Keck and Sikkink 1998) . The proliferation of these transnational nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) raises questions about their roles in the policymaking process, and requires new ways to research and theorise emerging transnational policy networks and policymaking processes. As a means of contributing to these theoretical and empirical tasks, this article analyses the global advocacy networks that have developed around the contested policy area of tobacco control. Although it is a relatively specialised area, with proponents, who usually work for NGOs, universities or government departments, and opponents, including international tobaccoo companies and their associated industries (tobacco growers, tobacco retailers, etc.), the adversarial nature of the tobacco control policy area, the extreme commitment of both tobacco control advocates and opponents to their ideological positions, and their concerted struggles to influence policy makes it an important case for studying transnational advocacy networks.
Using these networks as a case study, this article compares three approaches to understanding advocacy networks: the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) , the transnational advocacy network approach (Keck and Sikkink 1998) , and the transnational epistemic communities approach (Haas 1992) . I argue that the Advocacy Coalition Framework, which theorises how advocacy coalitions affect policymaking at local levels, and Keck and Sikkink's research into transnational advocacy networks, provide insights into the mechanisms of how transnational advocacy networks impact both domestic and intergovernmental policymaking. In particular, I link the advocacy coalition approach to the transnational advocacy network approach by showing that a local advocacy coalition can be an integral part of a transnational advocacy network, utilising its international links to further local policy and contributing resources (in the form of expertise, advice and support) to helping further its policy goals in other localities.
I will show that the epistemic communities approach, which argues that epistemic communities ('networks of knowledge-based experts' (Haas 1992:2) ) play an important role in transnational policymaking, has less to offer an analysis of the tobacco advocacy networks because it excludes many of the key players in tobacco advocacy and neglects the interactions between experts (members of the epistemic community) and non-experts in advocacy networks. Ultimately I argue that the local and the global are intimately connected in the tobacco control policy subsystem, and that to understand domestic policymaking in this area, one must go beyond an investigation of local advocacy coalitions and analyse the contribution of this policy subsystem's global advocacy networks.
Researching Tobacco Control Policy
Although policy networks and policy processes have often been studied by political and other social scientists, tobacco control policy has rarely been a focus and much of what has been published in the area has largely been journalistic. Research in health policy has, for the most part not focused on tobacco control. Much of the policy research that has been undertaken in the area of tobacco control concerns single issues, such as environmental tobacco smoke policies (eg, Dearlove et al. 2002; Ellis et al. 1996; Glantz and Charlesworth 1999) , and restricts its analysis to a single state or locality. There has been very little research in the area of transnational tobacco control policy (a notable exception is Studlar 2002) . This study contributes to the literature by focusing on the roles played by transnational policy networks in the area of tobacco control policy making.
Advocacy Coalitions, Transnational Advocacy Networks and Epistemic Communities
The Advocacy Coalition Framework The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is a theoretical framework used to analyse local policy networks. This approach proposes that an advocacy coalition is a local advocacy network which consists of actors who share a set of normative and causative beliefs and who undertake coordinated action in a specific policy subsystem over time (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999) . These actors may include administrative agencies, legislators, interest groups, researchers and journalists. They are united by their shared beliefs and commitment to their cause, what Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith call their 'policy core beliefs'. Policy core beliefs include agreements over the basic cause of the problem, its seriousness, and how it should be solved (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999:133) . In a given policy subsystem there may be several different competing advocacy coalitions. 'Since coalition actors (by definition) share a set of policy core beliefs, actors in different coalitions will perceive the world through different lenses and thus will often interpret a given piece of evidence in a different way' (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999:135) .
So members of competing coalitions will interpret new evidence in ways that are in accordance with their policy core beliefs. Proponents of the ACF argue that it is only appropriate for studies of policy subsystems over time spanning at least a decade (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999) . Policy subsystems can be defined in a variety of ways within the ACF, depending on which policy field is being examined. For example, tobacco control policymaking occurs within several different discrete policy domains, including health policy, finance policy, and agriculture policy. These domains can be thought of as overlapping in the tobacco control area. The existence of the tobacco control subsystem across a number of larger domains also provides an indication of the complexity of tobacco control as a policy field, with clear potential for conflict between different stakeholders. A subsystem's policy network, then, consists of its advocacy coalitions (often there is a dominant coalition and one or more minor coalitions (Schlager and Blomquist 1996) ) and policy brokers, who mediate between the competing coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999) . Policy brokers aim to develop compromises that reduce conflict between adversarial coalitions (Sabatier 1993:18-19) , and they tend to not be coalition members. In practice, they might be bureaucrats with some power to make compromises between competing coalitions occur.
With its focus on policy subsystems, researchers have used the ACF almost exclusively to study local and domestic advocacy coalitions, particularly in the area of environmental policy (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999 ). An exception is Litfin (2000) , who argues that in some policy subsystems the local and the international are becoming intermingled, and that the ACF adds to our understanding of these transnational cases. Extending this analysis, I will show that the ACF adds important insights into studies of transnational advocacy networks.
Transnational Advocacy Networks
With the exception of Litfin (2000) , the ACF has not, to my knowledge, been applied at the transnational level. At this level, the role of policy advocates has been studied through analyses of transnational advocacy networks, rather than domestic or local coalitions. Research on transnational advocacy networks is relatively new, with Keck and Sikkink's 1998 study, Activists Beyond Borders, being one of first systematic examinations of how transnational networks of advocates interact to effect policy change.
Initially, the concepts of the ACF and transnational advocacy networks approach appear quite similar. According to Keck and Sikkink, a transnational advocacy network includes policy advocates who share values, information and a common discourse (Keck and Sikkink 1998:2) . This is strikingly similarly to Sabatier's and Jenkins-Smith's definition of advocacy coalitions. Transnational advocacy networks not only attempt to influence policy, they also attempt to shape the policy environment by framing the ways their issues are discussed. As with the ACF, the mobilisation of information is key to the operation of these networks.
Both advocacy coalition and transnational advocacy network approaches emphasise the shared values held by coalition/network members. These values are ideologically based and serve to bond the group together. Both theories also stress the importance of information, and both are concerned with resources. Finally, both theories argue that networks/coalitions include a wide variety of actors in addition to the traditional politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups that policy researchers study, such as journalists and researchers. However, the two approaches differ in three key ways: (1) who is included; (2) whether the network/coalition is domestic or transnational; and, (3) whether the focus is on events or whether it is across time. I will discuss each in turn.
First, unlike the ACF, Keck and Sikkink specifically exclude industry-based interest groups from their definition of transnational advocacy networks. They identify three categories of transnational actor based on the different motivations of each: (1) those with essentially instrumental goals, especially transnational corporations and banks; (2) those motivated primarily by shared causal ideas, such as scientific groups or epistemic communities; and (3) those motivated primarily by shared principled ideas or values (transnational advocacy networks) (Keck and Sikkink 1998:30) .
This conceptualisation by motivation differs from that of the ACF, which includes all advocacy coalitions, irrespective of motivation. Keck and Sikkink justify the exclusion of industry-based networks and epistemic communities by arguing that the different motivations bring along with them different patterns of influence and political resources (Keck and Sikkink 1998) . In the case of tobacco control, their approach would exclude a protobacco advocacy network (ie, an advocacy network that came together around tobacco industry values and goals), while the ACF would include it. Is it theoretically useful to exclude industry groups from an analysis of transnational policymaking networks? As the tobacco control case study will show, the pro-tobacco network, which is industry-based, not only employs similar tactics to the anti-tobacco network, its members are also joined by shared values, and it uses similar tactics to the anti-tobacco network. Like the transnational advocacy networks described by Keck and Sikkink, '…the interpretation and strategic use of information' (Keck and Sikkink 1998:30) is the modus operandi of the pro-tobacco transnational advocacy network. In fact, the pro-tobacco transnational advocacy network has been arguably more effective that the anti-tobacco transnational advocacy network in achieving its policy goals. Excluding it from the analysis means missing half of the story in the tobacco policy subsystem.
The second difference between the ACF and the transnational advocacy network approach is that advocacy coalition research has, thus far (with the exception of Litfin 2000), focused on domestic advocacy coalitions, while the transnational advocacy network research focuses on transnational advocacy networks. The purpose of the transnational advocacy network approach is to shed light on how transnational advocacy networks influence both domestic and transnational policy. For example, Keck and Sikkink use their approach to analyse the development of the human rights transnational advocacy network, which includes domestic and international NGOs, intergovernmental organisations, among other groups, and analyse its effectiveness. The ACF, on the other hand, is concerned with local and domestic policy systems, and not transnational campaigns. However, there is nothing in the ACF that would prevent analysis of transnational actors who were coalition members. As the world becomes increasingly globalised, we might expect transnational advocacy network influences on domestic ACs to become increasingly common. The third difference between the two is that the ACF examines advocacy coalitions in policy subsystems over time, while the transnational advocacy network approach focuses on specific advocacy campaigns. These campaigns, also studied over time, have specific policy goals, but it is the campaign that provides insight into the network, not the network itself, which is the focal point of the transnational advocacy network research.
In contrasting the two approaches, the ACF is a much more clearly specified theory. It has been around for a long time, and many researchers have used and refined it. The transnational advocacy network approach is much newer, and much less clear in what its associated hypotheses might be. Given that the two have many similarities, the ACF might be able to provide transnational advocacy network researchers with theoretical options, particularly regarding (1) how networks mobilise information, (2) how coalitions compete, and (3) how shared values serve to unite coalitions. With its focus on campaigns and tactics, the transnational advocacy network approach might provide insights into the mechanisms by which advocacy coalitions reach their aims. As organisations become increasingly globalised, and as nation-states become increasingly interconnected, transnational advocacy networks will become ever more important in influencing both transnational and domestic public policy.
Transnational Epistemic Communities
The transnational epistemic communities approach argues that epistemic communities can influence policy through their expertise. As defined by Haas, 'An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issuearea.' (Haas 1992:3) . Members of an epistemic community establish an accepted set of knowledge in a particular area. They share a common understanding of a policy problem, its causes, and its remedies, and they use similar methods for verifying their facts. Members of epistemic communities, then, share a world view, similar to the way that members of advocacy coalitions share policy core beliefs, but the difference is that this shared belief comes out of scientific research into the area which has been subject to validation by the epistemic community and could change if compelling new research emerged to disprove it.
Like the ACF and the transnational advocacy network approaches, the epistemic communities approach emphasizes the importance of information in both creating the community, and in giving it policy influence. Unlike the other approaches, however, the epistemic communities approach focuses on understanding the roles that scientific experts in particular play in policy making (Dunlop 2000) . Similar to Keck and Sikkink's transnational advocacy network's, an epistemic community is defined as being based in 'principled' beliefs (Haas 1992) . Although the meaning of 'principled' is not elaborated, since an epistemic community is comprised of a group of scientists, its definition, then, would preclude industrybased advocacy networks, even if they base their policy advice in science. Can an epistemic community be a part of a broader advocacy network? The epistemic communities literature suggests that it could, as long as the epistemic community and the advocacy network had similar policy goals.
Turning to the tobacco case study, do the tobacco advocacy networks either constitute or include epistemic communities? Clearly the pro-tobacco network would not, as it is industrybased. However, the anti-tobacco network might include an anti-tobacco epistemic community, although the network is broader than its scientist members. The epistemic communities literature does not discuss how an epistemic community might relate to other interest groups in its area in any detail. In the rest of this article I will refer to local and domestic policy advocacy networks as coalitions or advocacy coalitions. Since the transnational advocacy network approach excludes industry-based groups, I will use the term global advocacy network, or GAN, to identify transnational networks of advocates that come together via shared policy core beliefs and policy projects regardless of whether those beliefs are principled. This will distinguish my approach from that of Keck and Sikkink. I will show that it is important to include industry networks, and argue that looking at GANs can help us to better understand local policy making processes in the tobacco control area.
In the following sections I look at the tobacco global advocacy networks, arguing that there are two active, well coordinated and competing networks in this policy area: a protobacco GAN, and an anti-tobacco GAN. I will describe the networks, then I will analyse them with respect to the theories outlined above. I will argue that both tobacco GANs are stable and each has a set of policy core beliefs that holds them together. Further, I will argue that, for this particular policy subsystem, looking at specific campaigns does not provide adequate insights into the networks' operations as the networks might be involved in several different campaigns in different parts of the world at any given time, yet would include the same members and policy core beliefs. I will further show that the epistemic communities approach, although descriptive of an important subgroup within the anti-tobacco GAN, does not provide additional insights into tobacco control policy mechanisms.
Tobacco Related Advocacy
Smoking was identified as being hazardous to health as early as 1950, when researchers in the UK and USA reported that smoking and lung cancer appeared to be causally linked (Doll and Hill 1950; Wynder and Graham 1950) . However, the anti-smoking movement did not really begin until the 1960s, when the Royal College of Physicians and the U. S. Surgeon General released reports that recognised smoking as a major cause of disease (Royal College of Physicians 1962; United States Department of Health Education and Welfare 1964). Since the 1970s there have been two recognisable, adversarial GANs in the tobacco control policy subsystem: the pro-tobacco GAN and the anti-tobacco GAN. These networks also have domestic correlates: competing ACs in each country where there is a tobacco industry.
As far as I am aware, there have been no systematic studies of the transnational tobacco networks, but there have been at least two domestic level studies: a 1999 study examined the pro-tobacco and anti-tobacco advocacy coalitions in Japan using the ACF as one of its theoretical lenses (Sato 1999) , and a 1992 study of British smoking policy networks (Read 1992) . The Japanese study found that policymaking in the smoking area in Japan was influenced by the two coalitions, and that it was impacted on by outside factors, such as increased knowledge of the harm of smoking, debates over the economic utility of tobacco, and the like. It also showed that, with its close links to government departments, the protobacco coalition was the dominant one, and was more successful in getting its interests reflected in policy than the less powerful antitobacco coalition (Sato 1999) . The British study used a different theoretical framework, that of policy networks, which includes producer networks, issue networks and policy communities (see Marsh and Rhodes 1992) . This study identified a well developed producer network, which is somewhat analogous to a pro-tobacco advocacy coalition, as well as less strong/more peripheral pro-tobacco and antitobacco issue networks. Although it was not a focus of the study, the pro-tobacco network in Read's British study was successful in influencing policy in similar ways to the pro-tobacco advocacy coalition in Sato's Japanese research findings.
The Pro-tobacco Global Advocacy Network
The tobacco industry is comprised of several very competitive and wellresourced transnational companies, including Philip Morris, British American Tobacco, Rothmans, R.J. Reynolds and others, along with local independents and associated trade organisations. With the influential reports that causally linked smoking with lung cancer in the 1960s (Royal College of Physicians 1962; United States Department of Health Education and Welfare 1964) the tobacco industry came increasingly under threat. At the global level, the tobacco industry has, since the 1970s, put aside its competitive interests and carefully coordinated some of its surveillance, research and public relations activities in order to protect the industry and expand its markets. The pro-tobacco GAN's major policyrelated goal is to influence tobacco policy at all levels of government, ensuring that regulations (including taxation policy, smokefree laws, etc.) are minimal (Studlar 2002) . A 1992 statement from Philip Morris provides a summary not only of that company's policy goals, but also of the goals of the protobacco GAN: 'PM-USA's Corporate Affairs objective is to minimize government interference in the production and marketing of cigarettes, and to protect the right of our consumers to smoke' (Philip Morris 1992b:1) .
It is difficult to get accurate information on the pro-tobacco GAN. The tobacco industry is notoriously secretive about its behaviour. The individual tobacco companies are fiercely competitive, and when they have joined together to oppose new tobacco related regulations their collaborations have been conducted privately. However, because of a 1998 agreement (State of Minnesota, et al. v. Philip Morris, Inc., et al., (Ramsey County), thousands of tobacco industry documents have been placed in depositories on the Internet. These documents are in searchable databases and can be accessed by the public. The data used in this section come primarily from these sources. The pro-tobacco GAN was organised as early as 1977, when the major world tobacco companies formed the International Committee on Smoking Issues (ICOSI), the aims of which included shaping public opinion about tobacco through media reports, pro-tobacco research (sponsored by the tobacco industry) and consistently denying the health risks associated with tobacco use (tobacco.org enews 2001). It provided an important early opportunity for the transnational pro-tobacco network to connect, and was succeeded in 1979 by the International Tobacco Information Center, or INFOTAB.
INFOTAB membership included all the major world tobacco companies and representatives from various manufacturers' associations (INFOTAB 1985) . Its purposes were similar to ICOSI, but more extensive, including the sharing of protobacco scientific data and "the coordination of data and information in economic, scientific and technical areas" (INFOTAB 1985:1) , dissemination of protobacco information in order to influence policymaking in the tobacco policy subsystem throughout the world. One way that the protobacco GAN knows where to concentrate its money and effort regarding tobacco policy is by keeping track of worldwide policy developments in the tobacco area. INFOTAB kept its members up to date on issues regarding the tobacco industry by summarising press coverage of tobacco related topics and disseminating industry reports on strategies used to '… further […] the industry's objectives or forestall […] antismoking action' (INFOTAB 1985:5) . It also reported on conferences (such as the World Conference on Smoking or Health) that might impact on the tobacco industry, and analysed tobacco-related issues and trends.
Members could request special research from INFOTAB. In short, INFOTAB provided a mechanism by which the tobacco industry could keep track of policy developments throughout the world, and work to influence them. It kept track of developments on a country-by-country and issue-by-issue basis (INFOTAB 1987) . Dissolved in 1991, INFOTAB was very active throughout the 1980s. However, the protobacco GAN is still very much in operation and now appears to focus on specific sub-issues of tobacco control, such as tobacco product regulation and environmental tobacco smoke. For example, in 1993 an International Industry Ingredients Group, led by Philip Morris and including representatives from the major U.S. and European tobacco companies, came together to develop an approach for dealing with the contents of cigarettes (Philip Morris 1993) . The contents (ingredients) of cigarettes are currently not regulated almost anywhere in the world, and this type of new tobacco control regulation is currently on the agenda of the antitobacco GAN. The existence of the Industry Ingredients Group suggests that the pro-tobacco GAN has been aware of this issue and has been strategising ways to keep it off the agenda for at least a decade. The tobacco industry recognises that regulations implemented in one place have an important impact on whether similar regulations are developed elsewhere, and it works to stop the implementation of any regulations that might be harmful to the industry before they are implemented. This is where having a transnational network is particularly useful: network members keep the network informed about policy developments in their region. As discussion below will show, the anti-tobacco GAN serves a similar purpose for its members. In summary, the pro-tobacco GAN exists to protect the interests of the tobacco industry around the world. It has existed via formal organisations, such as ICOSI and INFOTAB, and less formal working groups, such as the International Industry Ingredients Group.
These groups provide ways for tobacco companies, which are normally very competitive with each other and secretive of their practices, to come together in a mutually beneficial fashion to influence policy in various localities. These organisations allow the industry to collect mutually beneficial policy related information and decide collectively how to approach regulations that might threaten their profit-ability, if not their existence. In addition, the tobacco industry has worked to develop their associated industries into pro-tobacco advocates.
For example, they built up an agricultural lobby, in the form of the International Tobacco Growers Association (ITGA), which 'could "front" for [their] third world lobby activities at WHO' (INFOTAB document quoted by Yach and Bettcher 2000:210) . There is also ample evidence that at the domestic level the tobacco industry regularly funds front groups, such as smokers' rights groups and restaurant associations, to influence policy (Ellis, Hobart, and Reed 1996; Samuels and Glantz 1991; Traynor, et al. 1993) . Does the pro-tobacco GAN meet the definition of an advocacy coalition? If an advocacy coalition consists of actors within a policy subsystem who share a set of beliefs and coordinate their actions over time to work on a policy problem (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) , then the pro-tobacco GAN can be thought of as an advocacy coalition. Members of the pro-tobacco GAN share beliefs over the cause of the problem and its seriousness: they believe that their entire industry is under threat from antismoking activists, and their own internal research has shown that their products do cause disease and death, so they agree that the threat is real. The tobacco industry recognises that if the legality of its products is questioned anywhere in the world it places its entire existence at risk. This GAN has been in existence for almost three decades, so it also meets the longevity requirement of an advocacy coalition. Where the pro-tobacco GAN does not meet the definition of an advocacy coalition is in its transnational scope. And yet the relationship between the international basis of this GAN and its goals of influencing domestic and local policies is fundamental; its purpose is to influence policy at all levels of government.
The pro-tobacco GAN does not include an epistemic community even though the tobacco industry has used its own commissioned scientific research to support its policy positions. The definition of an epistemic community includes having principled goals, probably for the improvement of society, and this precludes industry-based groups, whose goals are to maintain and increase profits. In any case, there does not appear to be a committed group of experts (not on the payroll of a tobacco company) who support the pro-tobacco GAN's policy goals. Previous developments in tobacco control, such as the adoption of warning labels on cigarette packs, show that there is a clear process of national level policymakers learning from each other and implementing policies that correspond closely to policies in other countries (see Studlar 2002 for a discussion of policy learning in tobacco control). Because of this the pro-tobacco GAN funds extensive surveillance and support activities at the international level. Domestic subsystems are able to use the considerable resources of the global tobacco industry in fighting policies that may be damaging to the industry. The protobacco GAN, then may be seen as a resource for domestic pro-tobacco advocacy coalitions as well as having goals of its own.
As discussed above, the pro-tobacco GAN would not meet Keck and Sikkink's criteria for being a transnational advocacy network because they exclude transnational actors that have instrumental goals. This exclusion does not make sense theoretically; excluding industry based groups obscures the broader policy picture for many policy subsystems, such as tobacco control, where industry players are key. This is where the ACF's criteria for an advocacy coalition, that its members must share policy core values, may enhance the transnational advocacy network approach. The pro-tobacco GAN shares values, shares a discourse (in fact, it virtually controls the language used to discuss tobacco control internationally (Yach and Bettcher 2000) ), and coordinates its actions to affect local level policies, participating vigorously in campaigns affecting subsystem issues. It does all of the things that transnational advocacy networks do, and uses transnational advocacy network tactics, as described by Keck and Sikkink (1998) . By calling it a GAN we get a clearer picture of the global scene in the policy subsystem, showing that rather than there being transnational advocacy networks and other types of organisations competing with each other for policy control, there are, instead, different types of GAN competing with each other. We could argue that the pro-tobacco GAN's '…strategies/tactics are at odds with the norms of social and corporate responsibility' (Yach and Bettcher 2000:215) , but this is different from saying it is not a GAN.
The Anti-tobacco Transnational Advocacy Network
The anti-tobacco GAN is not as centrally coordinated as its pro-tobacco counterpart. It has no equivalent to INFOTAB, and its activities are run largely by interested, committed individuals who do so because they believe in the cause. The anti-tobacco GAN includes parts of intergovernmental organisations, such as the WHO and World Bank; international and domestic NGOs, including the International Union Against Cancer and the Cancer Council Australia; individual researchers; journalists and government officials. Unlike the pro-tobacco GAN which is funded by the tobacco industry, the anti-tobacco GAN is not very well funded and must rely on the goodwill of its members and generosity of its organisations to keep afloat. 'Networks are communicative structures' (Keck and Sikkink 1998:3) , so their members must have ways of sharing ideas, mobilising support for their cause, and conducting public relations. Anti-tobacco GAN members communicate both formally and informally.
On the formal side, members meet at conferences and meetings, by being invited to participate in expert panels or advisory groups, or by organising joint research projects. Individual tobacco control experts are often brought to other countries to provide expert testimony when new policies are under consideration (Thomson and Wilson 2001) . In 1992 an email (now web) based forum, GlobaLink, was developed for tobacco control advocates. GlobaLink provides its members with a way of keeping up to date with developments in tobacco control around the world, and with each other. Although GlobaLink is an important place for the anti-tobacco GAN to communicate, many of the GAN's members are not on GlobaLink, and they exchange information in other ways. On the informal side, when a tobacco control advocate wants the latest information or advice in a specific area, s/he will contact the network member(s) who are experts in that area directly.
The anti-tobacco GAN is used by domestic and local anti-tobacco groups to provide ideas and strategies regarding campaigns in their locale. News is widely shared throughout the network, alerting activists to what has occurred in other places. The electronic network allows members to share these informational resources instantly. Perhaps even more importantly, news reports and analyses from overseas members alert local members to what might be tried by the protobacco GAN in their local jurisdiction, providing advance warning of things to come. A local member can then request ideas from the GAN about how to counter the latest industry tactics.
The international community of tobacco control activists, who comprise the antitobacco GAN, is relatively small. Many of its members focus their work in specific subfields of tobacco control, and many of them are experts in their given areas. For example, American antismoking activist Stan Glantz, a professor at the University of California, is an expert in smokefree ordinances (Dearlove, Bialous, and Glantz 2002; Glantz and Charlesworth 1999; Samuels and Glantz 1991) and smoking in films (Glantz 2002; Glantz 2003; Kacirk and Glantz 2001) , while Ron Borland, an Australian and director of the VicHealth Centre for Tobacco Control focuses on the behavioural aspects of smoking, such as the effects smoke-free workplaces have on smoking behaviour (Borland, Cappiello, and Owen 1997; Borland, Morand, and Mullins 1997; Borland and Owen 1995; Borland, Owen, Tooley, Treijs, Roberts, and Hill 1999) , and the impact of the media on smoking (Borland and Balmford 2003; Donovan, Boulter, Borland, Jalleh, and Carter 2003) . Glantz and Borland are two individuals working towards a similar tobacco control goal as part of the global antitobacco GAN. Other activists focus on different subfields within tobacco control such as clean air/environmental tobacco smoke, advertising and sponsorship, health, tobacco product regulation, litigation, legislation, smuggling and youth smoking. Although these areas are discrete, many advocates work in several areas, creating links between the different branches of the anti-smoking GAN.
The anti-tobacco GAN keeps its members up-to-date on worldwide tobacco control occurrences through GlobaLink, but also through conferences and collaborative research. Key activists know each other and invite each other to come and speak. Members also meet through a variety of other mechanisms-the GAN is small enough so that if someone were interested in a particular subfield, someone they know would be able to give them the name of an expert in that subfield. Unlike the pro-tobacco GAN, whose goal is to prevent new initiatives, the anti-tobacco GAN is concerned with developing new and innovative ways to reduce smoking prevalence and reduce the harm associated by smoking. This difference is important because while the tobacco industry is working together to prevent all attacks on consumers' 'right' to smoke, the anti-tobacco GAN is not so coherent; the antitobacco GAN contains factions with differing views regarding key issues within tobacco control, such as how tobacco products should be regulated and which approach towards environmental tobacco smoke should be pursued.
Anti-tobacco activism at the domestic level has been described by various authors. For example, Tyrrell provides a history of the Australian anti-tobacco movements which describes the approaches taken by the antitobacco organisations and the tobacco industry over the late 19th and 20th centuries (Tyrell 1999) , Studlar describes different phases in tobacco control in the United States and Canada (Studlar 2002) , and Read discusses pro-and anti-tobacco networks in Britain (Read 1996) . Each locality has its own activists and its own historical circumstances, but what is important here is that most localities also have people who are members of the anti-tobacco GAN. This means that an Australian anti-tobacco expert is likely to be invited to discuss tobacco control in a place as small as Brunei as well as a place as large as Canada.
Not surprisingly, the tobacco industry keeps close track of the anti-tobacco GAN.
Industry documents reveal that the pro-tobacco GAN keeps track of which organisations are most important to the anti-tobacco GAN, which individuals are most influential, and how the anti-tobacco GAN is structured (Donck 1992; Philip Morris 1988; Philip Morris 1992a) . This analysis of the anti-tobacco GAN is much more detailed than that done by the anti-tobacco GAN itself, which knows little about the internal operations of the pro-tobacco GAN. The following quote is from a representative of the Tobacco Institute to one of his colleagues:
Through a worldwide computer network established by the Washington DC based Advocacy Institute, anti-tobacco activists are now able to transmit media advisories, reactions and proposed sound bites on virtually any smoking related issue to colleagues in other countries, and to the press. I have told our members that I believe that this expanding, sophisticated infrastructure is probably one of the greatest challenges our industry has confronted (quoted in Yach and Bettcher 2000:211) .
The anti-tobacco GAN meets both the definition of an advocacy coalition and Keck and Sikkink's definition of a transnational advocacy network. Members of the anti-tobacco GAN share policy core values: they seek to minimise the harm from tobacco products to public health throughout the world. They share a common discourse: they discuss tobacco primarily in public health terms, not economic terms. They work transnationally on their issue, and they exchange information and services. Like other advocacy coalitions and transnational advocacy networks, the GAN's membership includes researchers, government officials, and representatives of NGOs and, perhaps, the media. The anti-tobacco GAN also shares what Keck and Sikkink call 'principled ideas or values'. Because all anti-tobacco GAN members are not experts, the anti-tobacco GAN itself could not be called an epistemic community. Like the transnational advocacy network approach, the epistemic communities approach argues that epistemic communities come together around shared principled values, shared views of what the problem is, and shared policy goals (Haas 1992) . They are communities of experts, and they provide expert advice for governments, which consult them when policies in there area are under consideration. The antitobacco GAN might include epistemic communities consisting of various experts in various parts of the tobacco policy subsystem. For example, in the ETS area there are researchers who study the harm associated with second-hand smoke, the economic effects of smoking bans, and the efficacy of ventilation systems on preventing the spread of second-hand smoke. These researchers work in different fields, but they agree that passive smoking is bad for health, and should be limited. They expect to be consulted if policies on ETS are under consideration, and they provide their expertise throughout the world to further their policy goals. They interact with each other through conferences, and also through shared research projects. They meet all of the definitional requirements of an epistemic community.
Effectiveness
It is potentially difficult to assess what impact a global advocacy network has on policy. In order to assess an advocacy coalition's impact on domestic or local policy, you can examine policies in their jurisdiction over a period of time and determine which coalitions' interests are reflected in the policies enacted, the approach taken by ACF researchers. Since GANs might impact on policies in different locales, it can be challenging to determine whether they are successful. Although the policies that are implemented may often represent compromises between the competing advocacy coalitions, they often serve the interests of one of the competing coalitions while appeasing the other (Sabatier and JenkinsSmith 1999) .
The anti-tobacco GAN has succeeded in affecting policy in several tobacco subsystems in many states, such as banning exposure to ETS at workplaces, requiring cigarette pack warnings, and restricting tobacco advertising. These successes have, however, been tempered by the influence of the protobacco lobby, which has, particularly for the latter two but also for the first, managed to get the regulations watered down (for example, see Tyrell 1999 ). An example of this is cigarette pack warnings. Pack warnings are government warnings on cigarette packs. In all places where warnings are mandated the tobacco transnational advocacy network has managed to make sure that they are government warnings, not tobacco company warnings. Because they are attributed to the government, the tobacco companies can disassociate themselves from the content of the warnings and continue to deny the health risks associated with their products. They are able to operate as usual, while the interests of public health appear to be met. Research has shown that pack warnings have little impact on smoking behaviour among adolescents (Robinson 1997) . Again, the core issue of the tobacco industry's legal right to sell deadly products has not been addressed anywhere.
An analysis of how global advocacy networks affect local/domestic policymaking in the tobacco control area requires an examination of both the pro-and antitobacco GANs. Had I only been looking at the antitobacco GAN, as required by Keck and Sikkink's approach, I would have noted its success, but by also analysing the pro-tobacco side, I get a more nuanced picture of the tobacco control situation, showing that while the anti-tobacco side has achieved some success, the pro-tobacco side has been the more successful of the two at influencing policy and maintaining the status quo, which in turn benefits the tobacco industry. Of the two, the pro-tobacco GAN is better resourced, better organised, and its local connections have closer, more longstanding ties with domestic governments (Read 1996; Sato 90 1999; Tyrell 1999) . Although the key resource of the anti-tobacco GAN, its scientific information regarding the harms associated with tobacco, is powerful, the pro-tobacco GAN has sponsored powerful misinformation campaigns aimed at discrediting both antitobacco information and anti-tobacco activists (Donck 1992) . Looking at the two GANs as competing advocacy coalitions highlights the sometimes complex relationships that affect subsystem policymaking. It is likely that tobacco control is not the only policy area with adversarial global networks of policy advocates.
Advocacy Coalitions, Transnational Advocacy Networks and Epistemic Communities
Thus far I have described the global tobacco advocacy networks, arguing that there are two easily distinguishable and competing networks: the pro-tobacco network and the anti-tobacco network. Further, I have argued that these networks are both influential, but the pro-tobacco GAN has been the more effective of the two. Now I will return to the theoretical frameworks at the heart of this article: the advocacy coalition, the transnational advocacy network and epistemic communities approaches to policy analysis.
All three approaches define their advocacy networks as having members who are joined together through shared beliefs. In the cases of the ACF and transnational advocacy network approach, these advocacy networks include members from NGOs, government, and other interested parties; for the epistemic communities approach the networks consist of committed experts. The mobilisation of information and other resources is central to the operation of all three types of network.
I have argued that the advocacy coalition and transnational advocacy network approaches are essentially compatible, and I have used a combination of the two, a transnational advocacy network with shared policy core beliefs, which I have called a GAN, for my case study. What can the ACF offer to transnational advocacy network researchers? First, it suggests that transnational advocacy networks can, and, I have argued, should, include industry-based groups. My analysis has shown that the antitobacco and pro-tobacco transnational advocacy networks are competitors in the tobacco policy subsystem. They not only view themselves that way, it influences their behaviour, their tactics, and their likelihood of success. Discussing their success is far more meaningful when both sides are discussed as competing interest groups. The ACF, with its emphasis on policy core beliefs, rather than principled values, allows for competing advocacy networks to approach the same issue from a different perspective. The ACF stresses that advocacy coalitions are stable over time and should be studied over time. It also stresses that core policy beliefs are difficult to change. This is also true for GANs, at least in the tobacco control area. However, because their reach is so broad, and because GANs may have multiple subsystems within their policy subsystem, it does make sense to look at campaigns as well. For example, it would be interesting to analyse the two tobacco GANs operated in the ETS area over the 1990s, particularly how they built on early successes and changed strategies based on failures.
This tobacco control case study has shown the limits of the epistemic communities approach for analysis of this type of policy subsystem. In an area like tobacco control it is difficult to identify if there is a distinct epistemic community and, if there is, who its members are and how they relate to the broader GAN. In the anti-tobacco GAN, experts and committed nonexperts (eg, professional advocates) interact closely. Professional advocates, for example, utilise the findings of their expert colleagues and also encourage the experts to undertake specific types of research to further the GAN's policy project(s). In this case there does not appear to be extra value in analysing the experts as a separate group impacting on policy.
Because GANs do not appear to impact on local policy except through domestic advocacy coalitions, a study specifically of the relationship between the two would help to develop theory in this area. The work of Keck and Sikkink provides an important entry into the study of transnational advocacy networks, but is not yet a cohesive theory of them. As globalisation keeps advancing, the importance of GANs in policymaking will only increase. More work is required if such a theory is to be developed.
Conclusion
This article has shown that GANs have an important role in domestic policy processes. They serve as a resource that advocacy coalitions can utilise when required. They also, at least in the tobacco subsystem, keep track of policy developments globally, and when policies in the subsystem are under consideration, they become involved. This does not adequately describe them, however, because they serve an important role in their policy subsystem: they attempt to homogenise policymaking in their subsystem, encouraging their domestic counterparts to make similar (if not uniform) policies throughout the world. In the case of the anti-tobacco GAN, it seeks to ban tobacco advertising, restrict smoking to certain places, and control the sale of tobacco products. In the case of the pro-tobacco side, it seeks to maintain all of the those things, generally limit government regulation of tobacco products, and protect the right of smokers to smoke, as well as be able to extend its markets and increase its profitability. The policy goal, according to Philip Morris, is that 'We [the tobacco company] will be legal everywhere we do business' (Philip Morris 1993) .
